The situation regarding security policy around Greenland and the Arctic has changed fundamentally. Since the renewed escalation of geopolitical tensions and the increased US presence in the region, it has become clear that Greenland is no longer just a strategic periphery but a central arena of global power politics. The Greenland Summit in Washington in January 2026 marked a turning point, both in international perception and in the security policy strategy of the actors involved. The example of Venezuela impressively shows that these are not empty words. It is no longer just a matter of symbolic presence but of concrete control and influence, which are underpinned by economic investment, military infrastructure and security dependencies.
Innovations in the field of defence and security are no longer optional but an imperative requirement to preserve one's own sovereignty. Not least because of this, the start-up community in the field of security technology is experiencing an upswing, driven by international investment and a growing awareness of the importance of autonomous defence capabilities, with a view to becoming independent of the United States.
The trend continues: In 2025, USD 8.7 billion was invested in European defence start-ups, according to a report by the NATO Innovation Fund and Dealroom. In 2024, it was still around USD 5.2 billion. This corresponds to an increase of 55% compared to the previous year. Germany and the United Kingdom remain European leaders in terms of total funding. Munich in particular has established itself as a European centre for defence tech, with USD 1.7 billion in investments in 2025 alone.
The dominant technology in the sector is artificial intelligence in a wide variety of forms and applications, be it autonomous systems or data analysis.
In 2025, the political and institutional flanking of the European defence start-up community has become significantly more concrete and operationalized than in 2024. While 2024 was still characterized by programmatic announcements and political policy papers, 2025 will focus on concrete funding instruments, procurement mechanisms and industrial policy programmes.
Central to this is the further development of European defence initiatives such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the implementation of new instruments to strengthen the European defence industry, especially with a focus on SMEs and start-ups. Programmes such as the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) explicitly aim to scale innovative providers, integrate them into European value chains and promote cross-border cooperation. This is shifting the regulatory framework from selective project funding to structural industrial development.
For start-ups, this results in new opportunities but also more complex regulatory requirements. Subsidies are regularly linked to consortium structures, export control requirements, security inspections and IP regulations. In addition, there are stricter requirements in the area of investment control (FDI screening), especially for investments from third countries. The increasing sensitivity to security policy means that transactions in the defence sector are being examined more intensively than in 2024.
From a legal perspective, this makes early structured advice all the more important. Many areas of law – such as corporate law, state aid law, public procurement law, export control and investment screening – are intertwined. Projects in the defence sector therefore regularly require a cross-jurisdictional and cross-border approach. Those who strategically anticipate regulatory requirements can ensure eligibility for funding, reduce transaction risks and accelerate scaling. 2025 clearly shows that the regulatory framework is no longer a mere side effect but a key competitive factor in the defence tech ecosystem.
